During my last visit to India, I participated in a few meetings on questions such as strengthening the right information act, the role of the PDS, and other social issues. In all these meetings there was a vigorous debate on how mobile phones could be used on each of these issues given the rapid spread of mobiles in rural India. Despite periodic discussion about the use of technology, I did not hear viable ideas among my activist friends. I believe that this is in part because most of them are not advanced users of technology, and they have definitely not indulged in creating any application based on mobile phones. Consequently, they do not have the technical imagination on what could be done and what the limitations of technology are, even when there is a feeling that technology could be put to good use for the causes that they pursue.

While that remains the case with seasoned activists, many new initiatives have come from those who are savvier with technology. These interesting initiatives including an online bulletin board that could be accessed via mobile phones, mobile phone interface between underserved groups and medical professionals, monitoring of elections, platforms for civic complaints, et cetera.

While the applications per se are simple, the process of creating and deploying these applications is made a lot more complex by the fact that they have to deal with telephone operators to get short codes and other infrastructure, negotiate better deals with these operators for getting good rates, get servers (the location of the servers is sensitive since calls/SMS I typically initiated from these locations, and thus they have implications for cost), and deal with a lot of other technical issues that are in some sense peripheral to the project.

In addition to these technical issues, there will now be legal issues including a recent law that permits a maximum of 100 SMSes per SIM card per day. Dealing with all these issues, along with the cost of commercial providers makes mobile based social projects a costly one to undertake, that can be demotivating for most people who wish to take it up.

Given the context where a number of activists are thinking about the use of mobile phones for social causes, and the context in which a number of young people are taking imaginative initiatives, it would be useful to have a foundation that could offer basic mobile-based services on the cloud for public services applications. Such a foundation could accelerate innovations in mobile based applications by reducing the costs of creating such systems.

I imagine that such a service will offer servers that could be used to send and receive SMS messages and voice messages, a set of phone numbers that could be used around India, built in modules for surveys, mass messaging and other common uses. Finally, it should also offer an API for those who wish to build applications based on their need. The foundation can also negotiate good rates with telephone companies and train users on the legal issues.

Services such as Twillio in the US offer many of these capacities on ready-made basis, and services such as SMS-Gupshup have started providing some of these in the Indian context. These are mainly commercial providers, and so they costs are substantial. Public service websites like Kiirti.org provide some services for free, but they do not offer a facility for others to create applications using the website. Google’s SMS channel is a good resource, but it does not allow for customized messages. Thanks to these limitations, there remains the need for a platform with broad based capabilities; I believe that it will go a long way in fostering innovation in using mobile phones for social causes.

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During the 1980s, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), an NGO working in rural Rajasthan in India began to campaign for access to government records related to wage employment programs for the rural poor. In the course of their work, MKSS discovered that accessing official records and information was critical to exposing corrupt practices by officials at a local level. This soon became the central strategy in their fight against acts of corruption. MKSS rallied the support of other NGOs in Rajasthan, and started protests to make access to official records a legal right. The success of this movement in Rajasthan encouraged organizations in other parts of India to join hands with MKSS in lobbying for a powerful right to information law for the whole of India, which was passed in 2005.

MKSS and other NGOs involved in India’s right to information movement realized that merely having access to government records was not enough given the sheer complexity of the records and peoples’ ability to understand them. Over the last 20 years, they have developed a system for collecting, processing, and verifying government records and information on the ground. This process, known as a social audit, has now become one of the most popular tools to combat corruption in India.

Social auditing evolved in a rural setting in response to corruption that happens on a regular basis at the village level. This form of corruption is often referred to as corruption in the “last mile,” and it manifests in forms such as siphoning of pensions from the elderly, appropriating the wages of daily labourers, or diverting subsidized food grains from beneficiaries. The social audit approach allows India’s poor to play an active role in reducing corruption in their communities.

Social audits are typically organized by NGOs that work closely with the community, though some state governments in India have institutionalized this method with official patronage. The process of an audit involves gathering official records about a particular government project or development work (for example, cash books, muster rolls, measurement books, supply lists) and verifying if the activities and projects on paper, actually exist in reality. For example, let’s say that a ration shop that distributes subsidized food grains has recorded that Ram came to the shop every month and received 10 KG of wheat each month for the last six months. A social audit cross verifies this information through a door-to-door survey, where Ram is asked if he actually received his entitlement. If the audit finds that Ram did not receive his fair share, the community has proof that the ration shop siphoned rations and thus the act of act of corruption is exposed. The power of this process is evident by the fact that even though very few convictions happen on the basis of the findings of a social audit, data shows that the levels of corruption have reduced appreciably in places where audits have been organized regularly. After the data has been compiled, a large public gathering is organised where the data and findings from the audit are presented to the public. Typically, government officials, administrators, and citizens are invited to participate in these gatherings. .

The fundamental method of a social audit seems rather simple at first glance: access the official record and cross verify it with the person receiving the services or goods, such as the case with Ram. But, when you dig more deeply into the actual details of how the process takes place, there are many complexities and challenges. For example, one needs a lot of experience and expertise in order to understand which records to access, and whether they are complete and accurate. Once official records are obtained, it takes considerable skill and time to process the records before the door-to-door survey for verification of records can take place. These and other complexities make a social audit a costly affair requiring considerable human resources, skills, time, and organizational effort. As a result, social auditing has not been adopted on a wide scale throughout India, despite its promise. My hope is that with the right technology, the process can become more streamlined and efficient, and thus adopted more broadly.

I am working on an initiative at Stanford University’s Program on Liberation Technology to explore ways that technology, and particularly mobile phones, can be used to combat corruption at the grassroots level, and enhance the existing social audit approach. Through basic mobile phone SMS technology, official records on basic individual entitlements such as pensions, subsidized food grain, and maternity entitlements could be delivered to individuals via monthly text messages. Individuals, such as Ram in the scenario mentioned above, would be able to compare the count provided in the text message with the amount of rice he actually received. This would help him identify if he received what is legally due to him, or if a part of his entitlement was swindled without his knowledge.

We hope that this knowledge in itself would empower people who have been victims of corruption and would enable them to use this information to approach various grievance redressal mechanisms that they have access to. This might involve approaching senior officials, confronting the corrupt, or even taking up protests against the corrupt. At a later stage of the project, it may be possible to add other features that will enable the victims of corruption to take action using mobile phones. For example, the SMS could include the phone number of responsible officials, or an NGO could collect the complaints and initiate action on their behalf. While possibilities abound, we believe that the best initiative will come from the people themselves.

The main benefit of using SMS technology is that it requires very limited skill, knowledge, or effort from the user. And, it eliminates costly, time-consuming in-person surveys and audits. By using this technology, official information can be disseminated on a regular basis, unlike in the current model where social audits are done sporadically.

Like any technology tool, this of course has its limitations. One of the critical functions of social auditing in India has been its role in mobilizing the general public. The process of gathering people together face-to-face in a public meeting creates a collective energy, which can motivate people to fight corruption. By digitizing this system, these public gatherings will no longer be needed. That said, we believe that mobile technology brings the ability to more widely and regularly expose corruption that directly affects individuals, and as a result, has the power to ultimately lead to even greater collective anger that is often a precursor to mobilization. Further, it arms individuals with precise information – something they never had before — that officials cannot argue or ignore.

The project has now received the commitment of officials in the states of Bihar and Andhra Pradesh in India and a team that we helped organize is just starting to build the basic technology to store and disseminate public records. We will start with select programs such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in India and expand the coverage over the next few years. Once the technology is ready, it will be implemented for two years in randomly selected villages, so that we can test if it has an impact on corruption compared to other villages where the system has not been introduced

In the last 15 years, the number of countries with right to information laws has increased dramatically. Along with this, there is increasing digitization of public records, which will make this kind of exercise relatively cheap. This means that we now have the legal and technical infrastructure to enable millions, rather than a small number of well organized groups, to combat corruption.

I would like to thank Alma Freema’s support in editing the article.

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This is a response to a critique of wathiqah.com (a platform to discuss the future of Egypt’s constitution) in Meta-Activism Project. The article entitled “the revolution is not a branding opportunity” points out that the name of the commercial platform is visible prominently and takes an objection to it. She also discusses the limitations of such platforms to which I would like to respond.

The author points out that online discussions reach a very small proportion of the population, that they are not representative, and that they are easy to manipulate by well organised groups. I agree with the critique whole-heartedly, and I guess most people will do so as well. The question I wish to ask here is, given the problems, do such platforms have a democratic role at all?

If one were to examine any single dialogue process, I am sure we can find a thousand reasons to call it unrepresentative. Most active dialogues tend to involve small numbers of people. This can be said not just of a process, but also of any organisation, political party, social movement, or any forum. For that matter established electoral processes in the most advanced democracies too suffer from some of these limitations, in the strict sense of the word. For example, despite its formal representation of all US citizens, one could say that elected bodies could be hijacked by organized groups, and that the number of people who participate in electoral process is low, not to talk of effective participation.

To take a different example, social movements that have radically deepened democracy have been criticised for leaving out significant social groups. For example, the civil rights movement in the USA has been justly criticized for ignoring the voices of women; prominent women’s movements have been criticised for being unrepresentative of the voices of lower class women. The examples can go on and on.

My argument is that no single process, forum or organisation can perfectly satisfy all democratic principles. Democracy is an endless conversation that necessarily has to happen in multiple spaces. Wathiqah is one such forum that is mediating a few conversations. Its democratic role lies in the fact that it is engaging thousands of citizens in thinking about the constitution.

It enables a lot of individuals to voice their opinion about political issues. I believe that forming and articulating political positions is not an easy task, and that by making that process simple, the platform assists a lot of people to develop their political persona, which is critical for good citizenship.

Further, when a large group engages in a conversation, new ideas tend to emerge. The design of online discussion platforms help us identify some widely shared ideas. Such identification in itself is an important democratic act.

Enabling large numbers of people to engage with political issues, providing a space for people to voice their opinions, providing a forum for the exchange of ideas and the possibility of identifying a few widely shared ideas are the critical democratic functions that such a platform performs.

While these are democratic functions, we should acknowledge that online discussions are accessible only by a limited population, and that they remain vulnerable to hijacking by organized groups. Given these limitations, it would be a grievous mistake to interpret the “outcome” of the conversation as THE voice of a society.

If we understand the process with its limitations, and if online platforms are one among many other forums of conversation, then one could say that they serve an important democratic purpose. The critique at Meta Activism and others will ensure that we remember the partial nature of the conversation, and such reminders play an important democratic role as well. That said, we should not forget that partiality is the nature of any democratic conversation. Online platforms provide an avenue for large scale engagement and are especially good at reaching a lot of young people who are otherwise left out of political dialogue. I guess that is a goal that those of us committed to democracy can cherish.

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The level of corruption in the public distribution system has been one of the rallying points in the cry for change.  The following are some of the corruption related arguments for change:

There is large scale corruption in the system

It is undeniable that there is a lot of corruption in the PDS, and something needs to be done about it.  In arguing that we should shift from PDS to coupons or cash transfers, we have to ask if the chances of corruption will be lower in the proposed systems compared to what we have.  There is little evidence to make that argument.  India has a number of cash transfer programs such as old-age pensions, maternity benefits, family benefit, etc.  P. Chidambaram introduced a well-publicised coupon system in one of his budgets, and there are other benchmarks for the suggestions being made today.  If one wishes to do so seriously, they could examine the level of corruption in such programs and compare it with the PDS.

The proponents of PDS reform have not offered any evidence as to whether these alternatives work.  There are scattered references to a cash transfer program in Mexico, and in other parts of the world completely ignoring the reality at home.  I suspect that there are two reasons why we see no evidence that cash transfers work better: nobody has chosen to carefully evaluate the alternatives for the lack of interest in such an exercise, and in part because the unpublicized official evaluations of coupon experiments are not flattering making it difficult for proponents to use them for their purposes.  The proposed reform is thus not evidence-based in the Indian context; it is a purely ideological project based on the mainstream economics today.

The fact that the proposed reform is mainly an ideological project should not deter us from the possible merits of the reform proposals.  If a well considered idea has a promise, it is well worth giving a shot.  Is the reform proposal a well-considered idea?

Corruption is entrenched in the PDS

One serious argument is that moving to channels that we know to be less corrupt than the PDS could be a strategic way of reducing corruption.  This is certainly a serious argument to consider, especially given the deeply entrenched culture of corruption in the PDS.  While I do believe that corruption is deeply entrenched in the PDS, I do not believe that the system is irredeemably lost.  Many State governments have demonstrated that they could make the system work if it becomes a political priority, Chhattisgarh being an important example.  Beyond the PDS, one can take the example of Bihar that was considered a hopeless government, but a determined CM has shown how things can turn around dramatically with some political will.  Where the political incentive is to make money off such programs, the odds are that a proposed alternative would suffer equally.

Proponents have also argued that the banking system is less corrupt, and so using that channel would help in reducing corruption.  It may well work in areas where there is a good banking network.  It would be a move worth considering in urban areas, but then the use of banks does not eliminate every scope for corruption.  Ghost beneficiaries could continue to exist, those who issue periodic identification documents to beneficiaries could charge them, shortages in overall allocation could be created (as it gets created in PDS), which could then be used for arbitrage.  Other possibilities abound.

It does not work since the subsidy is not given directly

One curious argument that found its way to the economic survey 2009-10, and has been repeated by some prominent economists is that the PDS does not work since the subsidy is not given directly to the citizen, but is instead routed through intermediaries.  The idea that cash transfers or coupons will eliminate intermediaries is silly.  We don’t expect beneficiaries to have the direct access to the coffers of the Ministry of Rural Development from where beneficiaries will directly take their allocation of cash without the interference of any official whatsoever.  Cash transfer will have its own set of intermediaries.

If intermediaries are the problem, then replacing the PDS with coupons is the silliest idea possible.  First of all, there will have to be a system of distributing the coupons periodically to the beneficiaries.  This will necessarily involve multiple layers of the government.  Beneficiaries will then have to collect their entitlements from a grocery store or other shops, which are nothing but intermediaries.  Private shopkeepers will not have the same kind of accounting formalities, or any other measure of accountability that ration shop dealer will have to maintain.  In essence, the grocery store is an intermediary with little accountability.  The grocery store owner will in turn have to submit the coupons to a government agency which will reimburse her.  This additional channel will create its own set of opportunities for corruption.  In all, the coupon system only represents more intermediaries and less accountability.

The system is too large to monitor

There have been reports in the media that the Chief Minister of Delhi, Ms. Shiela Dixit, advocated cash transfers since the PDS is too large to be monitored effectively.  This is curious in a lot of ways.  Delhi is one of the smaller states, and the size argument should be the least problem there.  It should be even less of a problem compared to other states, considering the fact that the state has fantastic transport and communication infrastructure that makes monitoring easier.  Curiously, the argument of size has not been offered on Public Works Department or other departments that are much larger in the state.  Will we even consider eliminating them?  Delhi also has a well established right to information movement that has focussed on the PDS from the beginning that would assist a well-meaning Chief Minister in the quest to monitor.

Delhi’s RTI activists have met the Chief Minister time and again with well-documented information about corruption in specific ration shops, only to find the CM stonewalling.  If monitoring is THE problem, we would expect the Chief Minister to act on the information she was given.  Alas, that is not the problem.  How do we know that cash transfers will work better in her government? Do we know that existing cash transfers in Delhi work a lot better?  Sheila Dixit has been a wonderful Chief Minister for Delhi in many ways, but in this case her arguments cannot be less convincing.

The promise of right to information

Given that the PDS involves straightforward entitlements to specified beneficiaries, the right to information movement offers a terrific tool to contain corruption in the system.  Using the right to information, it is possible to identify precisely whether there is corruption in the system, who is corrupt and by what magnitude.  There is much that could be done to strengthen the RTI regime including proactive provision of information via notice boards, the Internet, mobile phones and other means.  If control of corruption is a goal, then we have to focus on means that we know to work, and means that have a promise instead of focusing our attentions on ideological projects with no demonstrated or theoretical reasons for the alternatives to work better.

The bottom line is that there is no doubt that there is a lot of corruption in the PDS and that something has to be done about it, and there is scant reason to believe that the proposal to change to coupons or cash transfers will reduce the level of corruption.  The government of Chhattisgarh offers to send a text message to anyone who wishes to monitor ration shop, whenever grains are delivered to such shops.  In addition, they have introduced stricter norms of documentation including the requirement that delivery trucks have to take a picture of the truck in front of the ration shop and send an MMS to the State government.  Such measures, along with the fact that the State government has responded more actively to complaints about the PDS have contributed to a major improvement in the system.  The power of right information can be extended even further using digital technologies more effectively.

A lot could be done to redress grievances about the PDS, which will automatically have an impact on how the system functions.  For example, setting up independent ombudsman, imposing penalties to officials who do not comply with PDS regulations, initiating independent call centres that could receive and officially lodge complaints, training the judiciary to respond to at least large-scale complains on the PDS, et cetera could be done.

Those calling for reforms have paid scant attention to other alternatives for better accountability.  It is particularly surprising when Chief Ministers and other powerful officials call for the reform, especially when we know that they could do a lot to change how the system works without radically reforming the system, if only it were their priority.

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Paying cash instead of grains will give people a choice

Another strong argument for coupons or cash is that the recipients will have the choice to spend it on what matters most to them.  Proponents of reform have argued that the Indian policymakers tend to be paternalistic, and often argue that if the government gives cash instead of grains, poor people may misuse it, including by drinking it away.  They have argued that it’s important to trust poor people to make choices that matter most to them.  I fully subscribe to that argument.  Even if there is a condition that beneficiaries should only buy food using the cash transfer, having the option of buying cheaper grains instead of rice or wheat offered in the PDS could be attractive to many a poor family.   Ashok Gulati argued that such choice could also bring about diversity in diet, which is a desirable goal.

If choice is something that we really care about, it is possible to introduce it in a limited extent in the ration shop itself.  Beneficiaries often have the choice of getting rice or wheat, choosing kerosene over other alternatives, et cetera.  The range of goods that are sold through the PDS could be increased, and a limited set of choice could be easily introduced within that system.  PDS reformers of a different brand have argued for a long time that the range of goods available through the PDS should be expanded, some of which should be sold commercially, in order to make the ration shop the more viable.  Such a system exists in Kerala.  While the range of choices may be increased at the ration shop, cash transfers are clearly superior alternative from the perspective of choice.

Poor people will use the cash transfer for the intended purpose

In response to the argument that men in poor families may use the cash for alcohol instead of food some have pointed out that 92% of the people who received cash to buy bicycles bought them in Bihar.  This was given as an incentive to send girl children to higher secondary school.  The assessment that money was used to buy-cycles as intended seems to be correct.  That said, it is a poor analogy to how cash transfers for food will be used.  In the example, girl children were expected to buy bicycles and provide proof of the purchase to the school teachers.  Such a mechanism would be totally infeasible in the case of monthly quota of food grains.

Kaushik Basu among others have argued that cash transfers should be made to adult women in the household, and this has proved around the world to result in higher spending by the families on food, education, health and other desirable ends.  I feel that this is a much more serious basis of arguing for cash transfers than the bicycle example.  Similarly, I am sympathetic to the argument that we have to trust the beneficiaries to use it for what they consider are the best reasons, even though it will result in some cases of what the society can judge reasonably to be a misuse of such benefits.

Coupons give a choice of shops

Another choice argument made by the proponents of reform is that cash transfers and coupons make it possible for the beneficiaries to go to an alternative shop in case the one that they’re dealing with is corrupt.  Today people are tied to a particular ration shop, and if the shop does not deliver they cannot do much about it.  The idea that people should be allowed to take their entitlements to a different place is powerful, and that can actually put a lot of pressure on corruption.  While that idea is powerful, it has strong limitations in a lot of rural areas that are serviced by very few shops.

The coupon system in particular will be vulnerable because of the fact that a private shopkeeper will have to recover her money from the government by providing the coupons, which could involve delays, corruption, et cetera.  This may prevent most shopkeepers from taking coupons, while the rest can merrily charge what they want without any accountability to the holders of the coupons.  Shopkeepers can cite this as an excuse and charge what they want from the coupon holders.  Since there will be no obligation for the shopkeepers to sell the goods at a particular price, they can hold the coupon holders to ransom without any legal accountability .  In other words, they can do exactly what a ration shop dealer would do in terms of charging excess price but the act will be totally legal.  It would be a case of eliminating a crime by eliminating the law.

The coupon system makes corruption a very attractive proposition since legal accountability is considerably reduced in public-private partnerships.  The argument of choice of shops hinges on the idea that there will be unrestrained competition between shops.  In most areas the choice of shops will be limited and the possibility of collusion is large.  Further, officials can easily ensure that honest shopkeepers do not get reimbursed on time and thus keep them away from the system.  If the profit motive of a shopkeeper will drive competition, it can also drive collusion and corruption to the last penny that can be extracted.  The removal of legal accountability, accounting norms and other features that now govern ration shops will only increase the attractiveness of corruption with the coupon arrangement.

Such a risk will be lower in the case of cash transfers, though it is possible that beneficiaries will be tied to either a bank or some intermediary from where they will have to collect the benefits; instead of paying a bribe at the ration shop, they will pay this at a different place.

The idea of giving a choice of shops could be done in a limited fashion within the PDS without compromising on accountability mechanisms.  In urban areas, users can be given the choice of going to any ration shop, and this can be made possible easily with the use of smart cards.  An official in Tamil Nadu told me that they consider such a proposal within the current PDS with respect to Kerosene, where the subsidy is high.  They proposed to open kerosene bunks that can provide an alternative to ration shops, and under measurement could be controlled more easily in mechanised kerosene bunks.  Running ration shop involves overheads, and the possibility that people may go to some other ration shop to collect their entitlements will threaten excessively corrupt ration dealers, and create a similar kind of pressure that coupons and cash transfers will accomplish.

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Please read other articles in this topic before getting here…

The cost of administering the PDS is high

Some economists have pointed out that the cost of administering the PDS is very high, and it is now possible to transfer cash to people at a cheaper rate.  This is one of the strongest arguments for a shift from PDS to cash transfers, in my opinion.  The amount of money that could be transferred just by eliminating PDS is substantial, and can go a long way in assisting poor families with it.

While making that argument, it is important to realise that an important proportion of the cost goes to transporting grains from surplus states to where it is needed, for warehousing, and other purposes that will not go away just by eliminating the PDS.  Perhaps the market will do this more efficiently, but we have not seen that happen with fruits, vegetables and other grains in which the government does not play a major role.  I should add that I am not ideologically presupposed to believe that the private sector does everything more cheaply than the government.  I would instead like a careful exercise to be made in understanding how the cost of private trade would change if the cost of transferring grains is absorbed by them instead, and if they are more efficient than the government.  The capacity that the government has to move around grains also has an impact on collusive speculation, something that we should be wary about in a country where food is a dominant part of the budget for such a large population.

The current system of procurements actually increases the price of grains for poor people who do not have access to PDS

Kaushik Basu made the argument that the government is a major hoarder of food grains, and in the process of procuring food grains and creating major stocks, we end up increasing the prices of food grains in the market.  Many poor people do not have an access to the PDS, and have to rely on the market for their food grains, and such procurement and hoarding increases the prices at which they buy.  Prof. Basu carefully distinguishes between the need to hold some buffer stocks, and excessive hoarding that would lead to a major increase in the food prices.

This is an important argument, but if we focus on excessive hoarding by the government, it is important to realise that it is not inherent to the PDS. The massive stocks that have been televised widely are mainly a recent phenomenon following the ill-advised move to target the PDS to a narrow section of the population in 1997.  Such targeting removed a large number of users from the system, and simultaneously the price of grains even for officially poor was increased over the market price, making it unattractive for anybody to buy through the system.  On top of this, there was also an increased procurement in the following years from the farmers, which altogether led to a massive accumulation of stocks well over the official buffer stock levels.  One cannot blame the PDS for it.

[Kaushi Basu’s article talks about the entire food grains system, and not just the PDS.  He is thus not arguing that the increase in stock is due to the PDS.  I am not arguing against his position, but would like to clarify that his concern cannot be added as an argument against the PDS].

We should give some new ideas a shot

The unceasing restrain of those proposing these reforms is that we should “experiment” with new ideas when we are confronted with a poor system.  There can be no argument against trying new ideas, and being creative.  Unfortunately cash transfer is not a new idea, and it is not terribly creative.  As I have argued elsewhere in this series, India already has many different forms of cash transfers.  The idea of coupons has been experiment with.  We not heard about the performance of these alternatives, and we perhaps never will, at least from the proponents of reform.

Cash transfers should be conditional

Ashok Gulati wrote about making cash transfers conditional upon families sending their children to school.  While this may be a suitable arrangement as an added support for families to send children to school, it is a very poor basis to determine food support for families per se.  A conditional transfer of that sort is better done through scholarships, school feeding and other school-based programmes.  Basic services such as food and health should not be offered with strong conditionalities attached to them.

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Many have argued that half the PDS entitlements reach the “non poor”.  I believe that resources are scarce, and the government should spend the money on people who need it most.  We should thus be concerned if resources are being spent on those who do not need it.  In considering whether resources reach the right people, we should remember that we have a rather poor system of identifying the poor.  The poverty-line based on which we classify a person as poor is woefully out of date and so people who would be identified by the society as living in abject poverty could be officially classified as ‘non-poor’.  As a result, the argument that PDS entitlements reach people who do not need is grossly exaggerated.

In addition to the definition problem, even those who could be officially classified as poor often get excluded given the problems with identification.  Proponents of reform are correct in identifying identification to be a problem; but then, they focus mainly on the non-poor being identified (which is an exaggerated problem), whereas my concern is that the poor are often left out in targeted systems.

Further, proponents of reform have made no argument on why the shift to coupons or cash transfers will improve the identification situation.  There is absolutely no reason either in theory and practice for the shift from the PDS to lead to an improvement in this dimension.  In fact, shifting to cash transfers will only worsen the identification problem:  The quality of PDS grains, the need to wait in line to get the grains, and other reasons make the PDS inherently unattractive to most middle-class and rich people.  As a result a lot of people who are well-off select themselves out of the PDS, which would not work with a cash transfer program.  Further, there are rich possibilities of providing different sets of grains (e.g. coarse grains) that may find a larger set of takers among the poor than those who have the means.  Cash offers no such means of self-selection.

UID will solve the identification problem

On a related note some have argued that the introduction of Unique Identity Cards will solve the identification problems for cash transfers.  The idea that the use of unique identity cards would solve the identification problem is perhaps the most ill thought solution for the problem of identifying who all need food support.  The use of biometric identification will have a limited but significant impact in reducing the number of ghost cardholders, and perhaps in ensuring that the same person does not get multiple entitlements.  UID offers no way of identifying whether a person is poor are not.  In addition, if the UID is able to offer any help in identification, it can do so equally well for PDS as for cash transfers.

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In evaluating alternatives including cash transfers, it is first important to identify both contributions and failures of the system.  Proponents of reforms today have focused exclusively on the problems, without dwelling on the things that it has done.  There is a reason why the PDS is so popular in Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Andhra and increasingly in other states including Chhattisgarh.  In all these cases the PDS has worked and means a lot to the life of poor people.  It has failed in other parts of India, and sometimes miserably.  Given that the basic structure of PDS is the same across India, one should ask whether the failure of the PDS is due to the design of the system, or whether it is due to larger problems in how these states function.  If it is the former, it makes immense sense to reform or even replace the system.  If it is the latter, we may spend a lot of resources and energy into replacing the system only to find that the alternative will suffer the same fate in the states where it does not deliver.  One problem with the arguments to replace the PDS lock, stock and barrel is that they do not ask serious questions as to why the PDS has failed in some parts of India; and instead they assumes that the PDS has been a failure overall.

Apart from the fact that the PDS has functioned well in some states, we should also take into account some of the inherent advantages in its design compared to cash transfers.  For example, it is more versatile at critical times such as galloping food inflation in its ability to get the government to absorb some costs, compared to cash transfer programs or anything else.  While it is possible in theory to adjust the amount of the cash transferred by taking into account inflation, such a process is politically unlikely to respond to massive food inflation unlike the PDS, where there is a prefixed commitment to provide the entitlements at a certain price.  Further, such as system will automatically respond to differing levels of inflation across regions of India, whereas the cash transfer system will have to have a massive input of information about differing levels of prices in every region, and it has to be accompanied by very complex arrangements to provide different amount of support to people in different regions.

The PDS also provides some means of social intervention when there is coalition among traders to artificially increase the price of grains.  It has served as an outlet of grains bought by the government to insure farmers with a minimum price for their produce.  The PDS also serves to transport grains from many of the grain surplus states into places where it is required.  I will not claim that these functions cannot be done by alternate arrangements; but, if we have to evaluate the system, we have to take into account what it has done along with what it has not; and we have to take into account what the costs of doing it through an alternate system would be.  The calls for replacing the PDS have generally been accompanied by a dismissal of the PDS system as an unqualified failure that accomplishes nothing.  The reality of the PDS is far more nuanced.

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“Do you want to wear an anklet or do you want to go to prison?” said a US consular officer in Hyderabad about the tagging of some Indian students in the United States to monitor their movements. These anklets contain a GPS device that closely monitors the movements of the students, and will alert officials in case they move beyond areas that they have been authorised to. The anklets provide a useful analogy to the Unique ID (UID) project by the government of India. Let me explain.

In an article entitled Prison without walls, Graeme Wood argues that such radio tags were originally created by BI (the market leader in such tracking systems) for cows. Radio tags containing a unique ID would be attached to one cow each. When a cow goes to the feeding station, the station would provide the cow with its ration by recognising the ID. Subsequently, if the cow comes back for a second helping, the unique ID would help the feeding station recognise that the cow has already had its share, and will not serve it any additional helping.

The system was later extended to people. For example, such a device (often in the form of anklets) would be attached to someone under house arrest. The radio tag will be monitored constantly by a sensor at the house, and if the person leaves the house, it would immediately intimate the police about it. This system was later extended in powerful ways by adding a GPS device to the radio tag.

The GPS device allows authorities to provide additional kinds of restrictions and freedoms. For example, a person under house arrest could be monitored, and it also allows other kinds of geographical restrictions on a person. For example, sex offenders are prohibited from going near schools and other areas that have a lot of children. Alcohol related offenders can be asked to stay away from bars, and a police officer will be intimated if such a person stays close to a bar for more than 60 seconds. It can also be used to monitor if the person attends a meeting of alcoholics anonymous, as they have been mandated to, by monitoring if the person is present at a given location on the given time and date.

Norms, freedoms, influences

The system could be understood by focussing on three key components. First of all, there are a set of norms that detail what the subject should and should not do. In the case of cows, the norm is one ration per segment of the day. For someone under house arrest, she is expected to stay within the geographical boundary of the house. For those who have committed sex/alcohol related offences, they are expected to stay away from certain areas.

Secondly, these norms circumscribe the freedoms of the subject. They selectively allow certain cows, certain students, certain people (the sex offenders), and others to do certain things and they prohibit them from doing certain things. They thus determine what kind of freedoms the subjects enjoy.

Thirdly, the anklets and other such IT devices give those in possession of power tremendous influence over the subjects. They do so by helping those in positions of power to establish the identity of the person. This identity helps the influential to closely monitor the actions of the subjects, and this in turn enables them to carefully permit or deny various actions of the subjects. This is often achieved by the threat of a greater punishment if the subject violates the norm that they are supposed to adhere to.

The UID Project

Different IT devices would be required to monitor different kinds of actions. For example, a GPS device would be able to establish if a person is in a bar, but cannot detect it if a person is having alcohol at home. There are other devices that can monitor alcohol content in the body by measuring the nature of sweating in a person’s body. They too have been used in the United States. The UID project by the government of India belongs to a class of such IT projects that can help those in positions of power to identify, monitor and regulate the freedoms of those within the Indian Territory, and Indian citizens abroad.

For example, the government has announced that it will use UID in the Public Distribution System to provide rations to people. They argue that the UID card will prevent people from overdrawing the rations, especially in the names of those who are either not authorized or those who do not even exist in reality. The home ministry is reportedly building the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) that will use the UID to closely monitor where we travel (based on our ticket purchases), who we talk to (using mobile phone data), and an assortment of other things. Such close monitoring will provide the government, especially the security agencies a degree of influence over people: from terrorists to those who oppose corruption vigorously.

By associating such devices with cows and prisons, I may have given a sinister tone to such devices. I should clarify that I’m not entirely against the use of such devices. They are the tools, and their merits should be understood by how they are used, and how they could be used. I will take that up in a subsequent article.

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Compared to most other states in India, Tamil Nadu is noted for widespread provision of education, primary health care, nutrition support, rural roads, electricity, water and other public services. These services are typically well planned and tend to work well. I examine what determines Tamil Nadu’s performance. I argue that widespread and decentralized collective action for public services plays a critical role in it but such collective action is a new phenomenon, dating back to the seventies. I also argue that normative challenges by major social movements, changing influences of various social groups and raising individual capabilities among common people played an instrumental role in enabling such collective action that ultimately had an impact on public services.

Click here to download the dissertation.

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